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PRACTICE IN BEHAVIOR RESEARCH:  
WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT1
PETER HARZEM2
AUBURN UNIVERSITY
There are no such things as applied sciences, only application of science.
Louis Pasteur3
On December 10, 1904, at the Nobel Prize ceremony, Professor Count K.A.H. 
Mörner4 introduced I.P. Pavlov, recipient of the prize for Medicine, as follows:
Your Majesty, Your Royal Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen, The medical sciences 
are mutually interdependent. Progress in one ﬁeld is often closely associated with de-
velopment in others….It is not always such progress, as immediately are useful and of 
beneﬁt, which should be considered as especially important; this character can also be 
attributed to those which are themselves less spectacular but form the basis for others 
which are then only a further development of it.
1. Originally this paper was presented at the 8th Biennial Guadalajara Symposium: Theory, basic 
and applied research, and technological applications in behavior science: Conceptual and Metho-
dological Issues, University of Guadalajara, Mexico, February 2004. Subsequently the procee-
dings of the symposium were published under the same title, in a book edited by Burgos and 
Ribes (2004). Unfortunately due to a mishap that is very rare in the hands of these editors, a 
large section of the paper failed to be printed in the book so that there the paper comes a dead 
stop well before its end. To compensate the loss, the editors have graciously invited the paper to 
be published in full in this Journal. It appears here in a very slightly modified form. Prior to this 
invitation I included the missing portions of the paper in an invited address given at the Annual 
Conference of the Association for Behavior Analysis. This note is to explain the unintended 
repetition, a practice which I have always disdained.
2. Department of Psychology, Auburn University, AL 36849-5214, USA. E-mail: harzepe@auburn.
edu Phone: +334 844-6482, Fax: +334 844-4447.
3. Il n’existe pas de sciences appliqués mais seulement des applications de la science.
4. Royal Caroline Institute, Stockholm, Sweden. 
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The aim of science is the acquisition of knowledge, the value of which should 
not be measured by the ease with which it can be brought immediately into practical 
usefulness…’
Hundred years have passed since then and in that brief time—brief in the big 
timeline of history—we have moved far from this principle. The principle was 
tacit from the earliest times when knowledge began to be formalized, to the 
legacy of the intellectual and scientiﬁc giants of Renaissance, and up to about 
the middle of the twentieth century. Through the millennia we applauded our 
engineers who built wonderful devices and structures that improved the con-
ditions of our lives, as we did our scientists and thinkers for their marvelous 
discoveries that at least in part satisﬁed our never-ending thirst for knowledge. 
Our departure from all this has not been a happy turn; it has not been towards 
any bright horizon of continuing progress but rather towards greedy dominan-
ce of what the scientist investigates by criteria of what quick proﬁt will result 
from it. 
This is not to neglect, of course, the relation between acquisition of new 
knowledge and the material value of some of that knowledge, at any given 
time. The two, as Professor Mörner had noted, interact, as they have done so 
through the ages. Legend tells us that Archimedes ran out of his bath shouting 
‘Eureka’ when he discovered the relation between the volume of an object 
and its density. He was delighted because that discovery would enable him to 
determine whether the crown ordered by King Hiero was made of pure gold 
or gold adulterated by the jeweler. Archimedes, apart from his mathematical 
work, also made some ‘engines of war’ that were used in the war against 
the Romans. However Plutarch reports that, ‘these machines [he] had desig-
ned and contrived not as matters of importance, but as mere amusements 
in geometry’ Moreover he did invent the ingenious implement, marvelous in 
its simplicity, for moving water uphill; namely the Archimedes’ screw5. None 
of this has been sufﬁcient, however, to label Archimedes an ‘applied …ist’ of 
some sort. He was a great, possibly the greatest, mathematician-scientist of 
western history. On the other hand, from Renaissance to mid-20th century, the 
careful observations and measurements of Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Kepler, 
and Newton and the conclusions drawn by them and later by Einstein, led to no 
practical beneﬁt. Beneﬁts of tangible sort from that body of knowledge ensued 
5. Permit me a personal note. From childhood I have marveled at the cleverness of this device, 
and admired the beauty of its simplicity. Paraphrasing Sir Thomas Beecham in a different con-
text—music—it makes me happy and hopeful to think that such a thing could be invented by a 
human being. 
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in the form of by-products, and began to emerge only after October 4, 1957 
when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I. 
Thus began the age of space exploration, coupled with an almost unnoti-
ced turmoil that changed the conditions under which science, scholarly theori-
zing, and inventing are done.
The beginning of the age of space exploration marked the rapid accele-
ration of the dominance of scientiﬁc research by those who control the purse 
strings in western societies6. No doubt this is due, in the ﬁrst place, to the fact 
that some scientiﬁc research became very expensive, beyond the reach of the 
individual scientist or team of scientists, or even individual universities7. This 
development, although quite understandable, produced a number of outcomes 
that had unfortunate effects—perhaps unforeseeable and even unavoidable 
effects—on the direction that the sciences have taken from the second half of 
the 20th century to the present. In democratic and quasi-democratic countries8 
the elected ofﬁcials facing the daunting task of allocating state and national 
funds to scientiﬁc research found it necessary to require some anticipation of 
beneﬁt9 that would accrue from such research. This, it would seem, was to be 
expected: they needed to demonstrate it to the electorate. The control did not, 
however, remain conﬁned to extraordinarily expensive research, but rapidly 
blanketed all academic work. Thus the process reached its peek when political 
power, in collaboration with equally powerful multi-national commercial com-
panies, acquired control over all of the work of the universities: what the aca-
demics should be encouraged to investigate, how and by whom the research 
interests should be determined, and, in sum, what should the development of 
knowledge include. These conditions have reached a state such that the pre-
sent practices of our universities would not now permit a young Albert Einstein 
to be given tenure or be appointed at a rank above assistant professor10, or 
an Edward Gibbon who took eleven years to write the Decline and Fall of the 
6. I say ‘western societies’ referring to that particular time. This is not, however, to overlook the 
fact that since then the practice has rapidly spread across the world.
7. Numerous other factors of this kind are involved here such as the increasing dependence of 
universities on public moneys under political control. However, considering them here takes us 
away from the main brief of this paper and will not be discussed.
8. What is described here also took place in non-democratic countries, for example the Soviet 
Union. There the accounting was to be made only to those in power.
9. Sadly, most western cultures no longer see growth of knowledge as a benefit—‘benefit’ has 
come to mean tangible gain: something one can eat, drink, be entertained by, etc.
10. Einstein graduated from the Technical Institute of Zurich in 1902 and worked in the Swiss 
patent office while working on his ideas—not empirical research—on the problems of Physics. 
He received his Ph.D. from the University of Zurich in 1905, and published three papers, des-
cribed by Stachel (1998) as ‘three papers that changed the face of physics’. On the strength of 
these papers he was appointed professor at the University of Zurich, and awarded the Nobel 
Prize in 1921. 
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Roman Empire to be appointed to a university position let alone be tenured or 
promoted11. 
It is against this backdrop that attempts to develop new kinds of psycholo-
gical therapy, focused on the behavior of the patient12 emerged. At ﬁrst these 
were generally, and quite descriptively, known as ‘behavior therapy’. As they 
developed, however, there arose ﬁne distinctions in their varied orientations. 
Thus, there came into existence groupings under the titles ‘behavior therapy’, 
‘cognitive behavior therapy’, ‘cognitive emotional behavior therapy’, ‘behavior 
modiﬁcation’, and most recently ‘applied behavior analysis’. These distinctions 
are not, however, substantive. They mainly rest on differences in minor detail 
concerning the way their practices are explained, and the words they use in 
those explanations. They do not represent progressive development as might 
be expected in sciences but continue to exist side by side. 
A simple search of those titles on the Internet brings up a would-be serious 
scholar’s nightmare, with numerous companies, institutes, centers, etc. vying 
for customers, some with music embellishing their web pages, with various 
claims for the soundness of their theoretical allegiances, and all asserting that 
they are based on Science—with capital S. For example one claims “Cogni-
tive Behavior Therapy has become the preferred treatment for most emotio-
nal and behavior problems13”; another claims “Rational Emotional Behavior 
Therapy works best for individuals desiring a scientiﬁc, present-focused, and 
active treatment14”; another explains “Behavior Modiﬁcation is used to descri-
be a program that relies on rewarding positive behavior in order to increase 
the frequency of such behavior15” ; and yet another asserts “Applied Behavior 
Analysis is a treatment based on the principles of operant conditioning, termed 
by the behaviorist, B.F. Skinner. The professional literature has documented 
ABA therapy as the most effective treatment for individuals with developmental 
disabilities16” (my italics). 
11. In recent decades this trend has taken yet a further large step, with the business/political power 
complex acquiring control over what shall be taught to university undergraduates, and not infre-
quently, how. The argument is clear: a state’s economy depends on the business productivity, and 
the productivity depends on employees trained appropriately—that is, according to the needs 
of the employers—by the universities. The employees thus produced are referred to as ‘human 
resources’ equivalent, it would seem, in their value and importance to other indispensable re-
sources such as oil and gas, farm produce enhanced by chemicals and the chemicals themselves. 
12. In recent decades ‘patient’ has been out of favor to name the person to whom therapy is being 
provided. However, the most commonly favored term, ‘client’ is even more troublesome, smac-
king, as it does, of crass commercialism. In this paper the word ‘patient’ will be used although 
this, too, does not fit well in some situations. 
13. Web page by John W. Bush.
14. Web page under Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy.
15. Web page by Eileen Bailey.
16. By Stacey Enfield in Behavior Analysis Treatment & Training.
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This is a picture of intellectual chaos. Such a state is not unusual in the 
history of Psychology, but it is not characteristic of any science worthy of that 
name. Differing and competing theories do, of course, exist in the sciences 
but they are about how empirical evidence are to be interpreted, and they give 
way to each other when new evidence bearing on them emerges17. The claims 
to scientiﬁc foundation by the different behavior therapy groupings18, if they 
are to be considered seriously—and so they should be, especially because 
they affect the lives of countless people, young and old—demand careful con-
sideration. We should note at this point that each of them is successful with 
some of the individuals they treat,19 especially if they are careful in selecting 
their subject population in the light of their past effectiveness. The possibility 
is very remote, close to nil, however, that these groupings are each based 
on a different ‘science’. If there is a science at their base, the differences are 
likely to arise from different understandings and interpretations of it. Is there 
such a science, and if so what is it?
Science, of course, is not mere knowledge, no matter how accurate it 
may be. It is knowledge that has been ascertained by observation or expe-
riment, critically tested, systematized, and brought under general principles. 
Only knowledge that is ascertained by observation and brought under general 
principles and thus systematized is science. We can accurately observe that 
there are n people in this room, and we can experiment to discover if, for 
example, background music affects how often the people in the room smile. 
Neither information thus obtained, by itself, is scientiﬁc knowledge. By the 
same token, the observation that simple praise does not reward John’s actio-
ns but bacon bits do affect his actions, while accurate, do not constitute scien-
tiﬁc knowledge20. This would seem self-evident but it is uniformly overlooked 
by the practitioners of any type of behavior therapy. Confusing the distinction 
between science and knowledge in general has been a major source of pro-
blem concerning the claims that behavior therapy—of each kind on its own 
right—is based on science. 
All varieties of behavior therapy use two main sets of knowledge: (i) clas-
sical conditioning and (ii) the effects of rewards; none of them is without the-
se two although they differ in other respects. Classical conditioning entails a 
body of sound knowledge ﬁrmly established in Experimental Psychology and 
17. Newtonian and Quantum Mechanics accounts of matter continue to exist side by side although 
they are incompatible; however they are about two different sets of phenomena, and to date no 
evidence has become available to bridge the gap between them.
18. I used the term ‘grouping’ because none of the others, such as ‘approach’, ‘application’ etc. 
accurately describe them, and falsely suggest a basic unity which does not exist. 
19. No therapy, whether medical, surgical, psychological, etc. is successful with every person treated.
20. This is an actual example of a boy in an institution.
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in Physiology—which was its original home. It is part of scientiﬁc knowledge 
but not a science of its own standing. Knowledge of the effects of rewards is 
different, however, in that it is simply about a set of phenomena commonly 
known, prior to any recourse to science. 
History bears witness that through the millennia knowledge of rewards 
(and of the companion phenomena, ‘punishments21’) was a powerful tool in 
the hands of many, enabling them to inﬂuence the fate of individuals at one 
level and nations at another. Kings, despots, benign leaders, and other cha-
racters of history have made astute use of rewards, and kingdoms have risen 
and fallen as a result. What they knew, however, though enormously power-
ful, was not science. A simple anecdote will illustrate the point:
Teacher. What did Isaac Newton discover?
Several hands go up.
Teacher. Yes, Brian?
Brian. He discovered gravity.
Teacher. Before Newton didn’t people know that unsupported 
objects fall?
Long silence. Then Jill puts up her hand.
Jill. Well he wrote about it.
Teacher. Yes. In fact he did more than just write about it, but we are get-
ting close to the point 22
Any claim to scientiﬁc knowledge in the use of rewards must rest, there-
fore, on what science systematically has made of that knowledge. Thus, we 
have two different, though related, sorts of knowledge concerning rewards: (i) 
general knowledge of the effects of rewards, and (ii) scientiﬁc knowledge of 
the effects of rewards.
Edward Thorndike (1911) is customarily credited with being the ﬁrst 
scientist who did systematically investigate the effects of rewards. He did not, 
however, discover rewards—just as Newton did not discover gravity—but ta-
king the commonplace knowledge as given, investigated the phenomena of 
learning and the effects of rewards on learning. In ensuing decades rewards 
were extensively used in experimental research into learning. That was the 
era of grand learning theories which produced anv enormous body of litera-
ture consisting almost entirely of animal experiments with varieties of mazes 
(see, for example, Hilgard and Marquis,1940,1961 and Estes, Koch, Mac-
21. For brevity I will not consider punishment separately in this paper. Much of the comments here 
about reward apply equally to punishment.
22. I have had this sort of conversation, many times, in both graduate and undergraduate classes. It 
helps classes to start thinking about the distinctions between ordinary knowledge and scientific 
knowledge.
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Corquadale, Meehl, Mueller, Schoenfeld, and Verplanck, 1954). Although the 
earliest attempts to develop a behavior therapy did take its impetus at least 
partly from Hull’s theory of learning, none of the details discovered by the 
experimental research reported in that literature had connection with the prac-
tices that have developed in the behavior therapy groupings. 
Against this background, in current times, the approach that is the most 
prominent, is applied behavior analysis. It has the claim solely to be based on 
a clearly identiﬁable body of scientiﬁc literature, the experimental analysis of 
behavior that more recently has come to be named behavior analysis,23 pre-
sumably in recognition of the fact that all behavioral/scientiﬁc work does not, 
indeed cannot, entail experiments. This scientiﬁc literature, pioneered by B. 
F. Skinner, differs in a number of signiﬁcant ways from previous theories and 
related investigations concerned with the effects of rewards. The prior work 
concentrated on the phenomenon of learning, and for a time the competing 
and complementing theories of learning were the dominant focus in psycholo-
gical literature. A major contribution of Skinner was to broaden this focus, so 
that beginning with the publication of his ‘Behavior of Organisms’ (my empha-
sis) in 1938 the subject matter of experimental research became behavior, no 
longer conﬁned to the narrower range of phenomena entailed in learning24.
Behavior analysis has at its foundation the following concepts25: ‘contin-
gency’, ‘consequence’ (of behavior), ‘response’, ‘reinforcer’ (and the related 
concept, ‘reinforcement’), and ‘discriminative stimulus’. The last three, res-
ponse, reinforcer, and discriminative stimulus go into ‘three-term contingen-
cy’ which speciﬁes a particular relation between them, and forms, according 
to the basic theory of behavior analysis, the building block of behavior pat-
terns. The empirical content of these concepts generally have been known in 
their empirical-scientiﬁc form since the experiments of Thorndike, and their 
more strictly speciﬁed forms since the publication of Skinner’s ﬁrst book in 
1938. Since applied behavior analysis claims to apply the ‘science of be-
havior analysis’, the support for the claim must rest on what developments 
of behavior analysis have reﬁned and enriched its practices in the ensuing 
seven plus decades. Although the literature of applied behavior analysis is 
quite voluminous, it is merely repetitive, reporting endless variations of the 
23. The literature of applied behavior analysis and the literature of the experimental analysis of 
behavior are mainly carried by the twin journals, the Journal of Applied behavior Analysis and 
the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior which are owned and operated by the same 
organization. All this makes examination of the claim to scientific basis of the application pos-
sible with reasonable clarity.
24. Curiously, this major turning point in the history of psychology which is due to Skinner’s work, 
has gone unnoticed by the followers of Skinner.
25. ‘Notions’ or ‘tenets’ may equally be fitting here.
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applications of these principles, reporting, for example, discoveries of what 
kinds of things idiosyncratically function to reinforce the speciﬁc acts of spe-
ciﬁc individuals. This information is, indeed, helpful to the practitioner who 
may be searching to ﬁnd a reinforcer that will affect the behavior of a parti-
cular person, but it does not indicate any advance in the scientiﬁc basis or in 
its application in practice.
The picture is not, however, as bleak as at ﬁrst it may seem. Through 
the decades it has gone unnoticed that applied behavior analysis has outpa-
ced behavior analysis, highlighting the necessity that the science of behavior 
analysis26 must beneﬁt from the reported observations in applied behavior 
analysis. What is now needed—urgently needed—is not supposed applica-
tions of behavior analysis in applied behavior analysis, but the application of 
applied behavior analysis to develop behavior analysis. The reason for this 
assertion is simple: applied behavior analysis has served to bring behavior 
analysis into contact with natural contingencies, and shown up what could not 
be captured in experimental work with artiﬁcial contingencies and their long 
established but seldom questioned component concepts. 
Laboratory experiments in all sciences entail preparations. In such prepa-
rations components of the phenomena being investigated are removed from 
their natural habitat, and for experimental purposes or theoretical reasons 
they are modiﬁed, often into forms that do not occur in nature. The science 
then tests, with equal rigor, to see if the principles discovered through the 
laboratory research hold for natural phenomena. It is this second, all-impor-
tant, phase that has been missing in behavior analysis, notwithstanding the 
guesses and wishful extensions that have merely rested on the ﬁrst-phase 
experimental research. Best examples of the latter are Skinner’s inﬂuential 
book ‘Science and Human Behavior’ (1953), its predecessor ‘Walden two’ 
(1948) and sequelae, e.g. ‘Beyond freedom and dignity’ (1971). These are 
the reﬂections of a master thinker musing on the possibilities of the line of 
experimentation he has initiated. They are not scientiﬁc reports.
In the case of behavior analysis the mismatch between scientiﬁc research 
and application of ﬁndings to natural conditions is primarily due to the fact 
that the units studied in experimental research do not exist in nature. In the 
standard Skinner box the ‘response’ studied is not ‘behavior’ in the established 
sense of the word but it is digitized behavior. Behavior is a highly varied, in-
deﬁnite set of analogue phenomena. No organism naturally repeats the same 
26. I use this term here for convenience but not with the implication that behavior analysis is a 
science of its own standing. It is, in fact, a part of the confederation of scientific endeavors 
collectively labeled ‘psychology’. Claims to the contrary, and their inevitable result of ignoring 
developments in other parts of psychology have unnecessarily handicapped behavior analysis, 
depriving it of much progress that might otherwise have occurred
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minute act for hours on end. By the same token, the experimental stimulus stu-
died is almost always a discrete event with clear onset and offset while under 
natural conditions most environmental events that enter into some relationship 
with behavior do not have discrete borders. Moreover, in nature none of the 
biologically vital events claimed to be reinforcers—eating, drinking, sleeping, 
sexual interaction—occurs in minute snippets. In contrast with experimental re-
search applied behavior analysis had to deal with the mainly analogue events 
that have no clear borders. As even a cursory examination of the literature of 
applied behavior analysis will show, the natural conditions have compelled 
the applied worker to apply the terms of behavior analysis to the phenomena 
he/she has to deal with, thus inadvertently creating a false impression that a 
science is beings applied. Thus, we hear of the person who is trying to give up 
smoking being treated as follows: ‘he is reinforced when he goes half an hour 
without smoking, then for 40 minutes, and so on;’ we hear of the person being 
given non-contingent reinforcement; and almost always we ﬁnd that the beha-
vior said to be reinforced is not at all like a response but rather a complex and 
varied pattern of behavior such as getting dressed, purchasing items from the 
institution store without assistance, conversing with a neighbor, etc., etc. 
In all of this the concepts of ‘consequence of behavior’, and ‘contingency’ 
play important parts and contingency is thought to be clearly distinguished 
from contiguity. Yet here, too, is we ﬁnd the concepts oversimpliﬁed. What 
follows an action may be contingent or contiguous, but the dichotomy is not a 
clear one. For example, a brick falling on one’s head when walking in a street 
is a contiguous consequence27. This is, of course, so simple an example that 
at ﬁrst sight it seems hardly to merit attention. The simplicity hides, however, 
shades or degrees of relations that may arise between even the simplest of 
acts and their consequences. Had there been warning notices about walking 
there, had the individual personally been warned about walking there, had he 
previously been ﬁned for walking there, and so on, we would be inclined to 
assign increasingly greater responsibility to that individual. The basic relation 
between the speciﬁc act and its simple consequence would have remained 
unaltered, but in each case the factors that go into the occurrence of the effect 
would be different. Common phrases such as negligence, carelessness, stu-
bborn deﬁance, and the like may qualify the act and go into explanations of 
why the incident occurred28. They also qualify the complex of factors that go 
27. Psychological literature on rewards, reinforcers, etc. often confuses the causation of an event 
and the effect of that event upon behavior that may be occurring at the time. Of course, the 
person’s walking there does not make the brick fall, but its falling on the person’s head is a con-
sequence of his happening to be walking there. 
28. In natural conditions no event has an identifiable single property, causal or otherwise. By ‘na-
tural conditions’ I mean all those other than experimental conditions.
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into the consequence: in one case the individual may receive compensation 
and in another, reprobation. 
On the other hand acts do, of course, cause consequences and there 
are, indeed, contingent relations, where the occurrence of an act is a sufﬁ-
cient condition for the occurrence of a contingent event. It is not, however, 
the necessary condition and it depends on whether the necessary conditions 
also prevail at the time. Through the 20th century the contingent action-con-
sequence relations have been the most studied in experimental psychology, 
and since the1940s they came to be termed, a là Skinner, response-reinforcer 
relations, mostly investigated in experiments with animals29. That research 
has produced a substantial experimental data on the behavioral effects of 
reinforcement and the complexities involved in the reinforcement process. 
However, this body of evidence, although meticulously precise in its expe-
rimental method and data analysis, has remained conﬁned to the carefully 
prescribed situations of the experimental investigation. 
The present discussion points to the inescapable conclusion that the 
theory of behavior analysis, i.e. reinforcement theory, is unnecessarily narrow 
as it stands, and is in need of revision. Such a revision requires new concepts, 
and reintroduction of some concepts that were eliminated in the early course 
of the development of the experimental analysis of behavior. Amongst those 
that need to be revived is the concept of reward. Rewards have identiﬁable 
effects on an individual whether presented contingently or not, and the effects 
when presented contingently are likely to be different from the effects when 
presented non-contingently. No doubt distinguishing the two conditions and 
many others that may not be apparent now, is a task for empirical study. 
The need for revision of the reinforcement theory has clearly been shown 
by the literature of applied behavior analysis. That evidence also shows the 
obvious: natural contingencies will affect behavior regardless of the theory 
to which the practitioner may subscribe. Now the task is to investigate those 
natural contingencies. To sum, it is time for applied behavior analysis to be 
applied in the scientiﬁc development of behavior analysis.
29. Strictly speaking ‘behavior-analytic’ or Skinnerian research distinguishes reinforcement, a tech-
nical term, from reward. Only a specific response, such as a bar press is reinforced and only that 
response is affected. On the other hand, in general usage it is the individual who is rewarded. 
One of the limitations of reinforcement research is its neglect of the far more heterogeneous 
effects of rewards as opposed to narrowly prescribed effects of reinforcement.
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